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The pendulum swings
The official results of the run-off election announced 
by Ukraine’s Central Election Commission made 
Viktor Yanukovych the new President of Ukraine. 
Mr. Yanukovych defeated Yulia Tymoshenko by a 
margin of 3.48%. Although Ms. Tymoshenko won in 
16 of the country’s 25 oblasts in the Center and West 
plus the capital, Mr. Yanukovych had greater sup-
port in the 8 more populous Eastern and Southern 
oblasts, Crimea and Sevastopol.
Yulia Tymoshenko has refused to accept the results, 
claiming that the vote was rigged by the Party of the 
Regions. Refraining from street demonstrations, Ms. 
Tymoshenko has turned to the High Administrative 
Court to demand a recount. This move seems aimed 
largely at her electorate in preparation for the next 
local elections and a possible snap election to the 
Verkhovna Rada.
The OSCE has stated that Ukraine’s “electoral pro-
cess met most OSCE and Council of Europe commit-
ments.” About 3,000 international observers were in 
Ukraine for the second round. Some 887,909 votes 
separated the two candidates and it will be virtually 
impossible to prove in court that violations of this scale 
took place. International consensus on fairness of the 
elections, a close match between all 6 exist polls and 
the CEC results leave little chance for the outcome of 
the 2010 Presidential election to be revised.
The era of the Orange Revolution team, which was 
mainly supported by the voters in Northern, West-
ern and Central Ukraine, is now officially over. It is 
said that revolutions are like Saturn: they devour 
their own children. But in Ukraine, as someone re-
marked, it is the children that devoured the revolu-
tion by failing to use the powerful mandate given to 
them in 2005.
There are two main reasons for the changing of the 
guard in the Presidency. First, the Orange forces 
managed to totally alienate voters who did not vote 
for them, at least in terms of rhetoric, if not by actual 
deeds. That provoked a reaction among those who 
felt that the election had been stolen from them in 
2004. Second, the Orange camp had relatively few 
serious successes to claim: the high hopes roused 
by the Orange Revolution quickly led to disillusion-
ment.
In the short history of modern Ukraine, power first 
changed hands along the East-South and West-
Center axis in 1994, when Leonid Kuchma, a “Red” 
director, won over Leonid Kravchuk, a Party ideolo-
gist. Those were times of unprecedented economic 
collapse and Leonid Kuchma used his broad Presi-
dential powers to stop hyperinflation and set the 
country on course to economic growth. In 2005, the 
pendulum swung again and Kuchma’s heir-appar-
ent was replaced by the more liberal Viktor Yush-
chenko, a professional banker.
Now, as in 1994, the country has a troubled econo-
my and a Western-oriented President has been re-
placed by the candidate of the East. Yet the situation 
is also different in important ways: the Presidency is 
nowhere near as powerful as it was under Mr. Kuch-
ma and political competition in the country is quite 
fierce.
Mr. Yanukovych won only 48.95% of the vote, while 
Ms. Tymoshenko had 45.47%. The margin between 
the candidates was only 3.48% and not the 10-15% 
predicted by the polls prior to the run-off. This 
means that a weakened President now has a weaker 
mandate as well.
This also means that the only one way for Viktor 
Yanukovych and the Party of Regions to hold on to 
power in Ukraine is to avoid the main mistake of the 
Orange team: alienating those who supported his 
rival. The small margin between the second-round 
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candidates and the substantial vote that went in the 
first round to Serhiy Tihipko and Arseniy Yatseniuk 
leave plenty of room for a counterattack against the 
PoR, should it get caught up in the euphoria of vic-
tory and forget the genuine pluralism of Ukrainian 
 politics.
The next 12 months will show whether Ukraine is go-
ing to move towards consolidation of power and build-
ing national consensus or not. There is still a high risk 
of a chaotic change of power and its redistribution 
between Mr. Yanukovych and Ms. Tymoshenko. This 
could send Ukraine into an even deeper economic and 
political tailspin. It also remains to be seen whether 
the next President will attempt to consolidate power 
through consensus, or behave as though it is a zero-
sum game and try to monopolize power.
Who is Viktor Yanukovych?
The comeback kid
Twice Premier – first under President Kuchma and 
then under President Yushchenko, Mr. Yanukovych 
lost the 2004 Presidential election in a repeat run-off 
after the Supreme Court declared electoral fraud. 
Five years later, he has come back as a winner.
Depicted as a villain during the Orange Revolution 
and a lame public speaker, Mr. Yanukovych is nev-
ertheless popular among millions of Ukrainian vot-
ers. This popularity can be attributed as much to his 
even-tempered personality and his image as an ex-
perienced manager, as to a shared sentiment among 
those who felt cheated and humiliated by what they 
saw as an unfair and unlawful defeat in 2004. Viktor 
Yanukovych also needed to grab what could have 
been his last chance in major politics.
Myths about Viktor Yanukovych: Reality check
Yanukovych is pro-Russia
In the course of the Presidential race, Viktor Yanukovych was traditionally labeled as a pro-Russian candidate. His critics 
point to, among others, Party of Regions’ ties with the Kremlin’s United Russia and his perennial electoral promise to 
make Russian a second official language in Ukraine. Although he does employ the language that appeals to Russia and 
generously drops the Kremlin a curtsy every now and again, he has proved reluctant to go much further. One example 
is when Premier Yanukovych, like President Yushchenko, rejected the option of coordinating WTO accession processes 
with Russia in 2006. Nor is it likely that the industrial bosses of the regions where Mr. Yanukovych’s support is highest are 
willing to be swallowed up by Russian Big Business.
Russia is pro-Yanukovych
Unlike 2004, when Russia’s then-President Vladimir Putin prematurely congratulated Mr. Yanukovych on his victory, in 
2010 President Medvedev carefully sent his congratulations well after US and EU leaders. According to a Russian Public 
Opinion Foundation poll, 47% of Russians believe that relations with Ukraine will improve if Viktor Yanukovych is elected 
in 2010. Moscow’s official position was that it was prepared to work with either of the two front-runners. In some ways, 
Yulia Tymoshenko could be an even better partner for Russia, if Mr. Yanukovych is supported by Ukrainian Big Business 
that fears competition from its Russian counterparts.
Yanukovych isn’t clearly left, right or center
Mr. Yanukovych’s 2010 election platform significantly expanded the list of social commitments, verging on serious pop-
ulism. However, the policy choices of Yanukovych Governments in the past showed him to be center-right, due to the 
strong representation of Big Business in PoR. In short, Mr. Yanukovych’s position can be best described as a set of plat-
form planks rather than a distinct ideology. 
Yanukovych is an effective leader
In contrast to Viktor Yushchenko, Viktor Yanukovych’s supporters sat their candidate is “an effective leader who can unite 
the country” and get his team to overcome the crisis. While his leadership style is indeed “tougher” than Viktor Yushchen-
ko’s, that does not guarantee greater effectiveness in presiding over Ukraine’s inefficient bureaucratic machine.
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Trials by power
In Ukraine, electoral platforms are rarely written to 
be fulfilled, so it’s better to evaluate the previous 
acts of candidates to have an idea of their further 
steps.
Viktor Yanukovych has already been Premier twice: 
in 2002-2004 and in 2006-2007. His first period in 
power was prior to the 2004 Presidential election 
and was clearly populist—typical of any politician, 
preparing for a major election. A quick glance at 
the second time he was Premier tells us more about 
what’s to come.
The 18 months of the second Yanukovych Govern-
ment, prior to the snap VR election in September 
2007, were marked by several trends. In politics, Mr. 
Yanukovych went into opposition to then-President 
Viktor Yushchenko and tried to monopolize power. 
Many questioned how democratic the establish-
ment of the “anti-crisis” coalition that supported 
Viktor Yanukovych really was.
After overshooting GDP growth almost twofold and 
leading to inflationary pressures under the first Ty-
moshenko Government, this Government’s social 
policy caused the growth of disposable income to 
slow down. That trend changed as soon as the snap 
parliamentary election was called, when bones had 
to be tossed to voters.
Under the Yanukovych Government, privatization 
was not especially transparent. Most prominent was 
the case of Luhanskteplovoz, a railcar manufactur-
ing, sold for the starting price in an auction at which 
competition had been severely restricted through 
biased strict requirements. Rinat Akhmetov’s DTEK 
also bought with no competition additional issue 
of shares of Dniproenergo, a state-owned thermo-
electric power plant operator. This deal was never 
formally reviewed, but was often used by Yulia Ty-
moshenko as an example of favoritism.
VAT arrears grew and, as did regional discrepancies 
in budget transfers. In 2006, the Government intro-
duced export quotas on barley, maize and wheat to 
control the price of bread on the domestic market. 
This led to losses among grain traders and accusa-
tions of ignorance of market principles.
In foreign policy, the Yanukovych Government 
approved of cooperation with NATO. However, in 
Brussels Mr. Yanukovych declared that he was op-
posed to Ukraine’s accession to the NATO Mem-
bership Action Plan in 2006.
All the King’s men
Viktor Yanukovych has always been linked to Big 
Business, although Party of the Regions is far from 
monolithic. There are at least two powerful groups 
that will compete for influence over Mr. Yanuko-
vych—and for portfolios.
One group is technically a lobby of professional 
bureaucrats and party activists. This group is rep-
resented by figures such as Mykola Azarov, Serhiy 
Liovochkin and Hanna Herman. These are mostly 
politicians and bureaucrats who were in power dur-
ing the Kuchma era. While there are professional 
skills in this group, it mostly embodies the less dem-
ocratic and more “discretionary” approach to pub-
lic governance. Moreover, this group has not lost its 
hunger for power and displayed its ambitions even 
during the years of Orange dominion.
The second lobby is Big Business led by Rinat 
Akhmetov, who controls Ukraine’s biggest private 
corporation, System Capital Management or SCM, 
and Borys Kolesnikov, his close ally. Although they 
had problems at the beginning of the Orange rule, 
this group has generally faired well and learnt some 
lessons from its experience. This lobby is likely to 
push for a market-oriented approach to economic 
policy. During the years PoR was in opposition, this 
group set up several high-quality think-tanks to de-
velop its policy muscle: the Foundation for Effective 
Governance and the Bureau for Economic and So-
cial Technologies (BEST).
At the moment, neither of these two groups has a 
well-prepared agenda. They seem to want power for 
its own sake and not to achieve specific goals.
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However, neither group is likely to ultimately win the 
power contest. The first group, the politicos, will get 
most of the portfolios but will likely remain receptive 
to the influence and the interests of the second.
Other Ukrainian businessmen not directly related to 
PoR, but seen on election night at Mr. Yanukovych’s 
campaign headquarters, such as Viktor Pinchuk and 
Dmytro Firtash, will favor his presidency and seek 
his support, provided that Mr. Yanukovych’s Presi-
dency really is the lesser evil. Russian businessmen, 
such as Konstantin Grigorishin, Viktor Vekselberg 
and Vadim Novinsky, have also greeted Mr. Yanu-
kovych for similar reasons.
Post-election battle blues
For Mr. Yanukovych, winning a Presidency means 
the beginning of the next power struggle in Ukraine. 
Ms. Tymoshenko remains Premier and the Verk-
hovna Rada has a legitimate Orange coalition. Local 
administrations still have to declare their allegiance 
to the new President, given that local elections are 
also coming up. State companies, holdings and 
banks are still controlled by top-managers loyal to 
Ms. Tymoshenko.
One of the hopes of the business and international 
community was that this Presidential election would 
finally bring consensus to the executive branch and 
put an end to the ongoing confrontation between 
the President and Premier. That hope may still be 
alive, but during the current transition period, Ya-
nukovych-Tymoshenko wars could make the Yush-
chenko-Tymoshenko stand-off look like a family 
squabble.
The latest decision of the Verkhovna Rada to post-
pone local elections originally scheduled for May 
could be the first harbinger of the battles to come. 
In short, the transition period has already started as 
“playing with the rules” rather than “playing by the 
rules.” Postponing local elections is a questionable 
move in terms of both rule of law and democracy.
Coalition-building woes
Without the support of the legislature, the Presi-
dent’s powers are limited to veto and to his right to 
make some appointments and nominations. A new 
pro-Presidential VR majority and the ensuing co-
alition are a must in making these election results 
a clear win, and not mere window-dressing. A pro-
Presidential coalition will make it possible to ap-
point a new Cabinet of Ministers and reach a con-
sensus of power in Ukraine. Hopefully, the mistake 
of the past will not be repeated and the Presidential 
winner will seek consensus rather than monopoly.
A situational majority in Verkhovna Rada support-
ing Party of the Regions is already functioning as 
businessmen in Orange factions look for ways to 
win favors from the new President. However, a situ-
ational majority will not be enough to appoint a new 
Cabinet of Ministers, nor will it be good enough to 
adopt a legitimate 2010 Budget. Moreover, a situa-
tional majority would not be sustainable in the long 
term because it cannot guarantee the satisfaction of 
the varied interests of its supporters.
Before the election, Mr. Yanukovych promised that 
his election to as President will be followed by a 
snap election to the Rada. However, there are no le-
gal grounds calling a snap election. What’s more, a 
new election may not be in the best interests of PoR. 
First, judging by her support during the elections, 
Yulia Tymoshenko will still return with a sizeable 
faction. Second, reshuffling the VR will likely bring 
new players such as Tihipko and Yatseniuk into 
play, while diminishing if not eliminating NU-NS, 
Lytvyn’s bloc and the Communist Party. It might 
prove even harder to build a pro-Presidential coali-
tion in the new legislature than in the current one. 
If a coalition cannot be cobbled out of the PoR and 
NU-NS factions in the next few months, a snap elec-
tion will become probable, extending the transition 
of power from several months to a full year—at the 
very least.
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Local elections, local appointments
While elections to Verkhovna Rada seemed only 
probable, elections to local councils were scheduled 
for May. Having taken 17 regions out of 27, Yulia Ty-
moshenko was well placed to go into them. However, 
the Verkhovna Rada managed to postpone them on 
the basis of 250 votes and has not yet rescheduled.
One of the prizes of the Presidency is the right to 
appoint heads of county and oblast state adminis-
trations (governors). It would only be logical for the 
President to try and change pro-Tymoshenko and 
pro-Yushchenko appointees at the local level prior 
to any elections. However, the candidates for these 
positions are supposed to be submitted by the Pre-
mier, who is unlikely to support Mr. Yanukovych in 
this. His inability to make new appointments quickly 
is one of the reasons for postponing elections.
It is possible for the new President to fire those 
heads of administration who are openly disloyal and 
appoint one of their deputies in an acting capacity. 
This approach was already tested during the Ty-
moshenko-Yushchenko stand-off.
However, sweeping changes of local administrators, 
especially in Western Ukraine, should obviously be 
avoided—at least prior to these elections. Such a 
move is likely to scare voters as the ousted officials 
play the “Donbas invasion” card.
Controlling state monopolies and firms
Once the battle over the Cabinet of Ministers is won, 
there will be a need—if not a burning desire—to 
change the top management of the state enterprises, 
holdings and banks. Control over a number of such 
organizations is vital to the new President.
NAK Naftogaz (natural gas monopoly)
NAEK Energoatom (atomic energy generation)
Ukrzaliznytsia (railway monopoly)
Ukrspetsexport (arms exporter)
Oschadny Bank (former soviet savings bank and 
the country’s second largest bank)
Their bosses are all appointed by the Premier and 
are usually chosen for a high degree of personal 
 loyalty.
•
•
•
•
•
If these businesses do not come under control of 
pro-Presidential forces, the President could find 
himself even further restricted as to powers. Re-
cently Mr. Dubyna, currently the boss of NAK 
Naftogaz, refused to share contracts for Russian 
gas supplies to Ukraine with President Yushchen-
ko. This is definitely a situation the new President 
wants to avoid if he is to get a grip on what’s going 
on in the country.
Appointees-in-waiting
Obviously, the President will try to build a coalition 
so that he can appoint his own Cabinet of Ministers. 
Currently, several candidates are being mentioned 
for the premiership: Mykola Azarov, Borys Koleni-
skov and Yuriy Boyko. There is also talk of the pre-
miership going to Yuriy Yekhanurov, Serhiy Tihipko 
or Arseniy Yatseniuk.
Whoever the new Premier is, a very difficult period 
faces that person, when extremely unpopular mea-
sures will have to be taken to restore the economy.
It is in the strategic interests of Party of the Regions 
to appoint a technical Premier, like Yuriy Yekhanu-
rov or Yuriy Boyko, someone who, on one hand, is a 
professional and, on the other, will be able to toler-
ate damage done to his or her image due to unpopu-
lar decisions. At the moment, only Serhiy Tihipko 
has declared his readiness to take on unpopular re-
forms.
But a new Premier requires a coalition in order to be 
appointed. As a PoR-BYT coalition is unlikely, Mr. 
Yekhanurov, Mr. Tihipko or Mr. Yatseniuk will be 
put forward by NU-NS if a PoR-NU-NS coalition is 
formed.
Still, ambitions could take over and a more engaged 
candidate from within PoR appointed. In that case, 
favors and privileges will likely start to be distribut-
ed left and right almost immediately. That will raise 
the hackles of the opposition and cause support for 
the new President to dwindle rapidly.
Serhiy Liovochkin, advisor to President Leonid 
Kuchma in 2002-2004 as well as Premier Yanu-
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kovych’s Chief-of-Staff in 2006-2007, has a good 
chance of becoming Chief-of-Staff in the Presiden-
tial Secretariat. Needless to say, this position will be 
the key to the success of the Yanukovych Adminis-
tration. The Presidential Secretariat should become 
a filter for the high tension that Mr. Yanukovych will 
face from the new coalition and PoR lobbies.
Petro Poroshenko could hold on to his position as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. However, other candi-
dates are being discussed, such as Ambassador to 
Russia Kostiantyn Hryshchenko, Ukraine’s repre-
sentative to International organizations in Vienna 
Volodymyr Yelchenko, Ambassador to Austria 
Yevhen Chornobryvko, and Ambassador to China 
Yuriy Kostenko. It is likely that the head of the For-
eign Ministry will be primarily a good manager, 
as the President will want foreign policy to work 
smoothly and not raise problems. The caliber of the 
potential candidates discussed reflects the low-key 
foreign policy that is likely to be pursued.
Policies coming our way
Predicting the future policies of Ukraine’s politi-
cians on the basis of their campaign promises is no 
better than reading tea leaves, as no policy docu-
ment exists that offers a realistic agenda for the new 
President. In Ukraine, as in too many countries, 
campaign platforms and promises do not usually 
correlate either with what the country objectively 
needs for its development, nor with what the newly 
elected official’s deeds will look like.
There are two possible directions in which the future 
President will go. First, he could repeat the strategy 
of Viktor Yushchenko: be an observer and a com-
mentator on the Government’s actions without of-
fering many alternatives. Second, he could become 
the initiator of change in the country.
In his first speech right after the run-off round of the 
election, Viktor Yanukovych mentioned1 six specif-
ic steps that he would devote the most attention to:
1 Speech after CEC announced first preliminary results 
http://www.partyofregions.org.ua/pr-east-west/
4b729d6e11124/.
Meeting the leaders of Russia, EU and the US,
Putting together a the new ruling coalition in the 
Verkhovna Rada,
Reorganizing the Cabinet of Ministers,
Adopting the 2010 Budget,
Renewing international financial aid to Ukraine, 
and
Fighting corruption.
Again, the powers of the President of Ukraine are 
quite limited and even the priorities voiced by Mr. 
Yanukovych are mostly outside of his direct power.
Furthermore, an analysis of how these priorities 
might get implemented into the reality shows that 
things are not so simple as a six-step program.
Foreign Policy
As Viktor Yanukovych, the anti-hero of the Orange 
Revolution, takes office, there is a sense of foreboding 
in the air that the country’s course on the internation-
al stage is about to change. Since Mr. Yanukovych’s 
position does much deviate from the one advocated 
by his predecessor, speculation about radical change 
may be getting blown out of all proportion.
However humble the achievements of the last five 
years may have been, Mr. Yanukovych’s foreign 
policy will build on the legislative and institutional 
legacy of President Yushchenko’s foreign policy. 
Besides, foreign policy is seen as a way to shape the 
nation’s identity and a model for state-building. En-
joying the support of less than half of the country’s 
active voters and barely one third of all eligible vot-
ers, Mr. Yanukovych is bound to pursue a low-key 
foreign policy that will keep his voters satisfied and 
his opponents reassured.
Because of the direct link between domestic politics 
and foreign policy in Ukraine, the new President 
will have to act carefully in an unstable and largely 
dysfunctional institutional system within which his 
power is held in check by multiple actors. Ukraine’s 
Foreign Minister currently has overlapping powers 
with the President and the Cabinet of Ministers.
•
•
•
•
•
•
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On one hand, Ukraine’s President is a key figure in 
foreign policy-making. According to the Constitu-
tion, the President represents the state in interna-
tional relations, manages the foreign policy activity 
of the state, conducts international negotiations, and 
concludes international treaties for Ukraine. The 
President also makes decisions on the recognition 
of foreign states, and appoints and dismisses heads 
of Ukrainian diplomatic missions to other states and 
international organizations.
On the other hand, other players have a stake in 
this area. Thus, the Verkhovna Rada determines the 
principles of foreign policy, consents to the bind-
ing nature of international treaties or rejects them, 
while the Cabinet of Ministers is responsible for im-
plementing foreign policy.
In short, unless Mr. Yanukovych is backed by a co-
alition in the legislature, his foreign policy activities 
will be severely restrained.
EU – Russia – US Triangle: Striking a Balance
As Premier, Viktor Yanukovych stated repeatedly 
that Ukraine’s course towards European integration 
was irreversible and that Ukraine had to put a lot of 
effort into meeting the criteria for the country to be 
able to claim EU membership.
Although EU membership is a strategic goal for Mr. 
Yanukovych, he will not ask for an immediate pros-
pect of joining the EU. He will, nevertheless, sup-
port negotiations and the conclusion of an Associa-
tion Agreement and a Deep Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) with the EU.
It will also be his priority to introduce a visa-free 
regime between the EU and Ukraine. This includes 
the highly politicized issue of border demarcation 
and the introduction of biometric passports.
In the meantime, Mr. Yanukovych strongly supports 
the development of economic and cultural coopera-
tion with Russia as Ukraine’s “special”partner. He 
wants the border regime between the two countries 
to be properly regulated and facilitated.
There are voices in PoR that would like to resume 
negotiations with Russia on Ukraine’s joining an 
FSU-based Customs Union—in direct contradiction 
to the FTA process. However, this lobby is unlikely 
to win because PoR’s industrial supporters clearly 
understand that their markets are in EU while Rus-
sia represents their competitors.
And given Ukraine’s dependence on Russian natu-
ral gas, the new President is likely to seek a closer 
and more pragmatic relationship with Moscow in 
the near future. Gas consortium talks with Russia 
are likely to be resumed.
Mr. Yanukovych is also likely to try and restore 
Ukraine’s standing in Washington. Yet he also 
pledged to withdraw the Ukrainian contingent 
from Iraq in 2004 and is unlikely to support send-
ing Ukrainian troops in support of either US military 
initiatives abroad or NATO-led operations that have 
not been sanctioned by the UN.
After inauguration, President Yushchenko made his 
first official visit to Moscow—which was followed by 
an unprecedented decline in Ukrainian-Russian re-
lations. It is neither clear nor important where Presi-
dent Yanukovych will go first. What is clear, at this 
point, is that Mr. Yanukovych will pursue a low-pro-
file, balanced, multi-vector foreign policy reminis-
cent of the Kuchma years.
Security: Eastward neutrality
As a point of departure in security policy, Mr. Yanu-
kovych’s Party of the Regions assumes that Ukraine 
faces no immediate military threats.
Mr. Yanukovych has been a vocal opponent of 
Ukraine’s NATO membership since 2004. Back in 
2006, Premier Yanukovych announced his deci-
sion to suspend negotiations on granting Ukraine 
a NATO Membership Action Plan in Brussels. Nor 
did he show enthusiasm about joining Russia’s 
proposed Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO). His position is that Ukraine should main-
tain neutral status, as a bridge between the EU and 
Russia.
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Despite his firm stance on neutrality, Mr. Yanu-
kovych expressed his willingness to consider revis-
ing the existing state of security in Europe. In this 
respect, he has aligned himself with an initiative by 
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev to create a new 
European security architecture.
Ukraine as a regional actor
In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, Ukraine 
made several attempts to assert itself as a regional 
leader. Yet even its key initiative, GUAM Organiza-
tion for Democracy and Economic Development, did 
not prove an effective enterprise. This was even less 
so under Premier Yanukovych, who showed hardly 
any interest in it over 2006-2007. However, Ukraine 
has been one of the key mediators in the Transdnis-
tria conflict and Mr. Yanukovych is likely to uphold 
the country’s role and presence there.
It also seems quite certain that President Yanu-
kovych will not give much weight either to coming 
up with new initiatives in the region or to reviving 
Ukraine’s interest in CIS. The future of Ukraine’s 
participation in the EU’s Eastern Partnership will 
depend on the evolution of that undertaking.
The EU has not lost Ukraine
Sabine Fischer, 
Senior Research Fellow, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris
An assessment of the development of EU-Ukrainian relations in the past few years presents a rather mixed picture. On 
the one hand, Ukraine has become a frontrunner in the process of rapprochement between the EU and the countries in 
its eastern neighbourhood. EU-Ukraine relations even served as a model for bilateral relations between the EU and its 
eastern neighbours in the framework of the Eastern Partnership.
On the other hand, Ukraine’s post-revolutionary aspirations towards European integration met with a lukewarm re-
sponse from the EU, while at the same time the Ukrainian leadership did not live up to the EU’s expectations regarding 
the pace and sustainability of domestic reforms. High hopes coupled with a lack of commitment on both sides let the 
EU and Ukraine slip into a vicious circle of mutual estrangement and fatigue. This has prevented much of the promising 
potential of the Orange Revolution from being fulfilled. 
Some observers may see the outcome of the presidential elections in Ukraine as the culmination of that process. How-
ever, such an interpretation does not seem to be appropriate. For the third time since 2004 Ukraine has held internation-
ally recognised democratic national elections. This should be seen as an achievement per se. Political and economic 
relations between the EU and Ukraine haven broadened and deepened, and this trend will continue. The idea of Evro-
integratsia has gained greater prominence in Ukrainian political thinking and, above all, cuts across different political 
camps in the country. Viktor Yanukovych may have been less pro-European a candidate than Viktor Yushenko, but his 
constituency, mostly associated with the eastern Ukrainian business elites, has developed an increasingly strong inte-
rest in closer relations with the EU.
To prevent further estrangement, the EU should now clearly recognise Yanukovych’s victory and encourage those who lost 
to accept their defeat and to come to terms with their new role in the opposition. A smooth transition of power and the 
build-up of a critical but constructive opposition would be important steps towards democratic consolidation in Ukraine.
Secondly, the EU needs to demonstrate its commitment to continue on the path of rapprochement with its eastern neigh-
bour. EU High Representative Catherine Ashton should meet the new Ukrainian President as soon as possible. The opening 
of negotiations on a visa-free regime would send out a particularly strong and positive signal to the Ukrainian population.
Thirdly, the EU, together with other international players such as the IMF and the US, should strongly encourage the 
new Ukrainian leadership to genuinely pursue the reform processes that are necessary to lead the country out of 
its precarious political and economic situation. Signals are already emanating from Yanukovych’s circle indicating an 
awareness of the urgency of reform. The EU and its partners must seize this opportunity and offer all the support that 
they are able to provide. Clearly, the endurance of such support depends on the commitment and performance of the 
Ukrainian partners. Future developments in the energy sector will be a good indicator – the perpetuation of opaque 
and corrupt energy trading structures will not only violate EU interests, but also the agreement reached after the Rus-
sian-Ukrainian gas crisis in early 2009.
The EU has not lost Ukraine, but it needs to carefully calibrate its policy so as to keep rapprochement going.
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Domestic policies
Back on track with IFIs
Premier Tymoshenko proved skillful in making 
promises not only to the voters of Ukraine, but also 
to the IFIs. However, dealing with these promises 
in terms of increasing consumer and commercial 
gas rates, adopting a Budget, building consensus in 
power, stabilizing the banking system, and starting 
the reform and modernization of the gas transit sys-
tem will be up to the new President and the Cabinet 
of Ministers.
Although representatives of the National Bank of 
Ukraine declare that Ukraine could do without the 
renewal of the IMF and World Bank financing it is 
clear that this is a risky affair that may cost image 
and power to the Party of the Regions.
Thus, the new President should honestly try to re-
store relations with the IFIs. For that, however, he 
will have to attain the required benchmarks rather 
than simply promise to do so.
Getting Budget 2010 up and running
Obviously, adopting the 2010 Budget will require a vi-
able coalition in the Rada, one that supports the Cabi-
net of Ministers, and a draft 2010 Budget. It will be an 
arduous task to achieve all three of these conditions.
Trying to rework the current draft Budget that is be-
fore the Rada and getting it passed by a situational 
majority would not do because it could easily be chal-
lenged by members of the formal current coalition in 
the Constitutional Court, undermining the legitima-
cy of the Bill. However, a new version of the Budget 
has not been drafted yet and will require time.
How US should continue cooperation with Ukraine
Samuel Charap 
Fellow, Center for American Progress
US policy toward Ukraine under the Obama Administration is grounded on a solid foundation and the strategic course 
should not change with the election of Viktor Yanukovych. The cornerstones of the relationship are the Charter on Stra-
tegic Partnership, the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Partnership Commission, and Bilateral Energy Security Working Group un-
der the aegis of the Commission. During his visit to Kyiv in July 2009, Vice President Joe Biden underscored the Admin-
istration’s commitment to support Ukraine’s independence and democratic development and facilitate the country’s 
becoming an “integral part of Europe.”
In terms of concrete policy priorities, I am confident the election of Mr. Yanukovych should not affect US support for 
Ukraine’s Euroatlantic integration; its encouragement of economic, democratic, energy-sector and legal reforms; the 
open door for Ukraine’s accession to NATO; or cooperation with the IMF and other international financial institutions on 
Ukraine’s economic recovery—including pushing Kyiv to comply with the conditions of the IMF loan.
While its strategy should remain unchanged, the Administration should adjust its diplomatic approach in light of Mr. 
Yanukovych’s victory: the period immediately following his inauguration should be seen as an opportunity to shape the 
new President’s posture towards the outside world. Mr. Yanukovych and his team know that many in the West—in my 
opinion, wrongly—consider him a Kremlin stooge and they will be looking for ways to demonstrate early in his term 
that this is not the case.
An invitation to Washington, or a high-level visit to Kyiv would be a powerful gesture to President Yanukovych that the 
West accepts him as a legitimately elected President and wants to continue to strengthen relations with Ukraine under 
his Presidency. If it shuns Mr. Yanukovych or spends the early months scolding him for Ukraine’s failures to live up to its 
commitments, then the Obama Administration could alienate Ukraine’s new leader and make it more likely that he will 
tune out Washington in the future.
However, symbolic outreach can only last so long. Ukraine fatigue is indeed very deep-seated—and for good reason. 
The cure for it will be found in Kyiv, not Washington or Brussels. The US must get the message across that if President 
Yanukovych wants his country to be taken more seriously in the West, in the long term, he needs to produce “deliv-
erables,” in particular energy reform and adherence to IMF conditions. Only concrete results will cure Ukraine fatigue. 
Washington has no more patience for promises, speeches or grand plans.
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Adopting a new Budget in order to renew co-opera-
tion with the IMF and the World Bank will also require 
some unpopular decisions to get the deficit under 
control. It will mean putting a stop to increases in so-
cial spending and revising the Budget to cut as many 
expenditures as possible, while making it realistic. 
PoR will also have to find a way to not implement the 
Law on increased social standards that was adopted 
on its initiative prior to the election. Adopting a real-
istic Budget will also mean dodging many electoral 
promises made in the heat of the campaign.
Energy politics
The top goals in the energy sector will be getting gas 
rates to cover costs and reliably paying Russia’s gas 
bill. The former will be highly unpopular, though 
unavoidable, as many in PoR understand.
Mr. Yanukovych has offered to return to the idea of 
a gas consortium, with Russian, the EU and Ukrai-
nian partners owning equal parts of the Ukrainian 
transit business. Such a move is definitely aimed at 
getting a better deal on gas prices for Ukraine and 
slowing the rise of domestic gas rates. Setting up a 
gas consortium is likely to be a lengthy business, as 
it requires amending sensitive points in Ukrainian 
laws on the ownership of pipelines and reforming 
NAK Naftogaz Ukrainy.
Ukraine will move ahead with the Energy Community 
Treaty, as it is in the interests of the business groups 
linked to PoR to increase energy cooperation with 
the EU. The promises made by the Tymoshenko Gov-
ernment to foreign partners regarding energy reform 
are likely to be supported by the new President.
Taxes, aid and privatization: Fair or not?
Policy in these areas is unclear and is highly depen-
dent on which lobby within PoR will prevail. If the 
bureaucratic lobby does, then there is a high risk 
that tax rules will be highly discretionary, benefits 
will start to be given to this or that industry, and the 
privatization will go into full swing, but based on 
unfair competition. If the business wing of PoR gets 
control over economic policy, there is lower prob-
ability of all of the above, because business realizes 
that whatever is applied against their competitors 
today could be turned against them tomorrow.
As for a possible redistribution of property, re-priva-
tization is unlikely to happen. More likely, greater 
attention will be paid by PoR-related businesses to 
state assets that are waiting to be privatized or that 
are under the shaky control of this or that business 
group. Unfortunately, transparency and fairness of 
prices at such auctions is not likely to be high.
In 2009, the Government of Ukraine introduced 
subsidies to the steel and chemical industries in 
the form of lower gas, electricity and railway rates. 
There is a high risk that lobbying for state subsidies 
of this kind could grow.
Tongue-twisting trouble
The Constitution of Ukraine guarantees “the free development, use and protection of Russian and other languages of eth-
nic minorities of Ukraine.” Unlike 2004, Viktor Yanukovych clearly stated in his 2010 election platform that he favored “grant-
ing Russian the status of Ukraine’s second state language.” He also supports “a civilized solution to the issue“ and refers to 
“the universally recognized norms of international law” and the European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages.
The idea of making Russian a second official language in Ukraine dates back to the early 1990s and was one of the most 
effective slogans of Leonid Kuchma in his campaign for the Presidency against Leonid Kravchuk in 1994.
To fulfill this promise, however, a draft law introducing this amendment must be adopted by no less than a Constitutional 
majority or two-thirds of the Verkhovna Rada and approved by a referendum designated by the President of Ukraine.
Although this is an unlikely scenario, members of the Party of the Regions have claimed that they would simply draft a 
number of laws to regulate the use of language in education and the media. These attempts could serve as a tactical 
maneuver to distract public attention from substantial economic issues. But they could also come at a high price to Mr. 
Yanukovych, who will be seen as dividing the country instead of seeking consensus.
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Seven tests for Victor Yanukovych
To understand the direction in which Viktor Yanukovych is taking the country, it might be useful to consider a number 
of yardstick issues against which to measure Mr. Yanukovych’s potential and wisdom as a statesman.
1. European Choice. With a change of Presidents after five years of knocking on the EU’s door, Ukraine finds itself back 
at a crossroads. It remains to see how the new President will manage to combine the strategies of furthering Eu-
ropean integration and restoring good neighborly relations with Russia. As promised, Viktor Yanukovych will not 
be nagging the EU to swing its door wide open for Ukraine, but Ukrainians will not give up their cherished dream 
of joining the European family. Whether the new President chooses to work towards integration with the EU and 
build friendlier relations with Russia remains to be seen.
2. Democracy. As an overarching concept, democracy—perceived by many as the key accomplishment of the Or-
ange Revolution—stands out as an indisputable value on Mr. Yanukovych’s political platform. It is safe to assume 
that, with a strong opposition in the Verkhovna Rada and constant vigilance on the part of the civil society, Ukrai-
nians will not be deprived of their right to vote in free and fair elections, freedom of speech or other liberties. The 
more Mr. Yanukovych “talks the talk” about democracy, the harder it will be for him to disentangle himself from this 
discourse in the long run. As a word of caution, however, it must be stressed that any attempts to curb democratic 
achievements by Mr. Yanukovych’s government, fears and hopes aside, have to be immediately detected and con-
tained.
3. Fighting corruption. Corruption permeates virtually every sphere of life in Ukraine today and was declared a threat 
to national security by the National Security Council in 2009. No reforms in any area will be possible nor will a Yanu-
kovych Presidency be effective unless the President adopts a proactive approach to implementing anti-corruption 
legislation. 
4. Civil service reform. The new President inherits a sluggish state machine aggravated by corruption and little sustain-
ability. To ensure the success of his undertakings, he has little choice but to streamline Ukraine’s Civil Service. Yet 
this issue is not high on the agenda and Party of the Regions seems blind to the importance of civil service perfor-
mance for delivering on their promises. Taking into account the traditional resistance of any state bureaucracy to 
change, Viktor Yanukovych’s best efforts could be undermined unless serious attention is devoted to the ability of 
state machine to perform.
5. Judicial reform. The combination of a weak judiciary, no mechanisms for enforcing court decisions, and pervasive 
corruption has resulted in widespread discontent with and mistrust of the courts of law in Ukraine. In 2006, Pre-
mier Yanukovych declared his intention to intensify the judicial reform. But with financial restrictions and political 
turmoil looming large, most plans, if any, are likely to be suspended. Still, incremental change is possible as Ukraine 
introduces European standards into its legal system. In this context, much will depend on technical and financial 
assistance from foreign partners.
6. Constitutional reform. After a compromise reached at the height of the Orange Revolution, Ukraine received a hast-
ily kludged parliamentary-Presidential system. As a result, the 2004 changes left the country in deep political chaos 
because of a poor division of executive power that led to overlapping responsibilities between the President and 
Premier.
 No doubt Mr. Yanukovych’s camp recognizes the importance of the needed changes as could be seen in Summer 
2009, when he teamed up with Ms. Tymoshenko to push for a new draft Constitution. Yet in the upcoming period 
of political reconfiguration, any attempts by the new President to seriously amend the Constitution will most 
certainly be vehemently opposed and treated as usurpation of power, unless broader consensus between the 
government and the opposition is reached.
7. Administrative-territorial reform. While it is the priority of Mr. Yanukovych’s Party of the Regions to grant more inde-
pendence to territorial communities through decentralization, the unsuccessful 2005 project demonstrates that 
little progress can be expected unless the idea of the administrative-territorial reform is phased in after months of 
public discussion, is supported by regional leaders and, most importantly, remains as neutral and non-partisan as 
possible. Furthermore, the reform is doomed to fail without matching reforms to tax and budget regimes.
Inside Ukraine, #5, February 2010
1
Inside Ukraine is published by the International Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS) as part of its project implemented under the 
Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms (UNITER) program, which is funded by the United States Agency for International 
The year ahead: Consensus or chaos?
The power struggle in Ukraine is likely to last until 
May 2010 or, in the worst case scenario, until the be-
ginning of 2011—depending on whether a coalition 
is formed in the current Rada or the legislature goes 
for re-election. It is too soon, now, to make a solid 
prediction as to what course Ukrainian politics will 
take as it is built mainly around personalities and in-
terests rather than ideologies and principles.
BYT will probably become the new opposition to the 
President, shedding some deputies from the business 
wing of the faction who will most likely look for fa-
vors from the newly-elected President. Should Mr. 
Yanukovych’s first steps be to increase confrontation 
in Ukrainian society, thus deepening economic hard-
ship, there is a great chance that the opposition will 
come back to power well before the next Presiden-
tial election. Either during pre-term VR elections or 
during the regular elections in 2012, Mr. Yanukovych 
could be faced with a Rada set against him and lose 
his grip on the Cabinet of Ministers. It is also possible 
that his Constitutional powers could be reduced even 
further on. Such an outcome will hopefully serve as 
strong incentive to look for consensus now.
Ukraine’s newly-elected President does not have 
a strong mandate from voters, nor does he have 
strong Constitutional powers. It will be up to the po-
litical acumen of Viktor Yanukovych and his Party 
of the Regions to consolidate power in Ukraine and 
overcome the current economic turbulence that has 
been exacerbated by electoral battles.
Hopefully, Mr. Yanukovych will reject the standard 
Ukrainian practice of blaming his predecessors for 
all existing problems and undertaking sweeping 
change of civil servants. Under the impact of a world 
crisis, Ukraine’s problems are mostly external and 
many remedies that Ukraine has to take have no 
substitutes.
